We propose the use of methods based on the Shapley value to assess the fact that private returns to lower levels of educational attainment should incorporate prospective returns from higher attainment levels, since achieving primary education is a necessary condition to enter secondary and tertiary educational levels. We apply the proposed adjustment to a global dataset of private returns to different educational attainment levels and find that the corrected returns to education imply a large shift of returns from tertiary to primary schooling in countries at all income levels.
Introduction
Numerous studies have aimed at assessing the relationship between education and earnings and obtaining estimates of the private returns to different attainment levels. Typically, such estimates derive from earnings regressions and are interpreted as the expected premium for an extra year of schooling in a particular attainment level, keeping other personal characteristics constant. This equates the return to primary, say, with the earnings premium of primary graduates only, thereby ignoring that 'primary education is a necessary input into further levels of education which may have higher economic returns. If the benefit that primary education confers by permitting access to more lucrative levels of education is taken into account, its true return will increase.' (Colclough, Kingdon, and Patrinos 2009, 3) To our knowledge, only Appleton, Hoddinott, and Knight (1996) have investigated this issue quantitatively.
They include in the return to primary the expected prospective returns of secondary and tertiary education (that is, weighted by the probabilities of subsequently completing those cycles), and demonstrate that taking the sequential nature of attainment progression seriously can greatly increase the estimated primary return. However, this approach cannot be applied simultaneously to returns at all attainment levels without double-counting.
Here, we use an analogy between the problem of (re-)attributing returns between primary, secondary and tertiary education and cost allocation based on the Shapley value. Such a reinterpretation of the problem yields returns at all levels of schooling that account for their prerequisite relationships. Using the global dataset on education returns recently developed by Montenegro and Patrinos (2014) , we calculate adjusted returns for all countries with available data. Our results indicate that adjustments based on the Shapley value generate a large shift of returns towards primary in countries at all income levels, for both males and females.
The Shapley value and returns to education
The Shapley value provides a conceptual basis to the distribution of coalition pay-offs with desirable properties.
Specifically, only this division rule satisfies additivity, efficiency (the full coalition pay-off is distributed), symmetry (equal pay-off for substitutable players) and the so-called null-player axiom (players not contributing to the pay-off of any coalition receive zero pay-off). While attainment levels are not perfectly comparable to players in a coalition game, the logic of Shapley values of 'fair shares' derived from the expected marginal contribution of players entering a coalition makes it suitable for the computation of prospective returns to education.
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Assuming a strictly linear dependent ordering of successive schooling levels i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N }, the Shapley approach yields particularly simple results. Denote by r i the marginal return to attainment level i over level i − 1. When derived from coefficients in a log-earnings regressions, these returns are in units of the baseline wage for an individual with no education.
The Shapley value corresponds to the sum
over all possible orderings R of the N players, where P R i is the set of players preceding player i in R, and v(S) is the worth of coalition S. From here on, we assume N = 3.
In the context of returns to different edcational attainment levels, this leads to payoffs shown in Table 1 . For instance, in the second row, when the primary-education 'player' joins the empty coalition, its worth increases by the primary wage premium r P . When the tertiary-education 'player' joins next, this does not increase the coalition's worth, since exploiting the returns of tertiary education depends on (yet absent) secondary. The wage only jumps from a primary-graduate wage to a tertiary-graduate wage when the secondary-education 'player' joins. Summed across orderings, the tertiary marginal wage premium r T is shared equally between all 'players', r S is shared equally between the primary and secondary 'players', and the primary 'player' retains all of r P . order primary secondary tertiary
rP , rS, and rT represent the marginal wage premiums. Table 1 : Marginal payoffs to primary/secondary/tertiary education 'players' as they join the coalition in every possible sequence.
Labeling the fair share of the marginal return to attainment level j that is attributable to level i as r ij , the 3 above derivation generalises to the straightforward expression
Accounting for all returns requires combining the return to primary education for those with primary only with the returns attributed to primary for those with higher attainment. Let p i be the share of the population that completed level i. The conditional probabilities q ji of having completed at least level j among those having completed at least level i are:
The adjusted return is simply the weighted sumr i = j r ij q ji .
Alternatively, considerr
− i = r ii , the return attributed to level i for an individual with attainment i. This has the advantage of not requiring knowledge of the participation rates. However, by reducing the returns to higher levels without increasing the returns at lower levels, some returns remain un-attributed. We therefore refer to these as 'decremental' adjusted returns, indicated by the minus-sign superscript.
Both adjusted returns are comparable to conventional marginal returns in that they capture the benefit attributed exclusively to a given attainment level, net of the contribution of lower levels. They are, however, Using the above data, we compute adjusted returns to education for three attainment levels and both sexes.
Unweighted averages aggregated over sex and all countries are depicted in Figure 1 , annualised to match the scale of the standard figures. Figure 1 shows that the position of primary and tertiary clearly flip after the adjustment, with adjusted primary returns far exceeding adjusted secondary and tertiary returns, which are approximately equal.
Returns to secondary education are affected both positively and negatively by the re-attribution implied by the adjustment proposed, with a negative net effect reflecting the relatively low participation in, and therefore gains flowing down from, tertiary education.
The large reduction in the return attributed to tertiary education implied by the proposed adjustments is not balanced by the increasing returns to primary and secondary. For the decremental adjustment, this is unsurprising, given its 'leaky' definition. For the preferred balanced adjustment, which does re-attribute all returns, this is explained by the fact that the adjusted returns to primary, for instance, accrue to all individuals with at least, not just the ones with exactly, primary education attainment.
Disaggregation by gender and country income level (Figures 2) confirms that the effect of the adjustment is most accurately described as a shift towards primary (as opposed to a shift away from tertiary). There are no noticeable gender differences with respect to the effect of the adjustment. It is also evident that the bulk of the shift results from the re-attribution away from the higher levels, rather than the re-attribution towards primary. As a result, the purely decremental adjustment, which can be calculated even without knowledge of participation rates, represents a surprisingly good approximation to the full adjustment in terms of indicating the overall shift in balance. 
Discussion and policy implications
We propose a method based on Shapley values to adjust returns to education across attainment levels, thus accounting for the prospective nature of lower educational attainment levels as necessary conditions to achieve higher ones. While theoretically justifiable, the magnitude of the adjustment implied by Shapley values may seem excessive. Letting the tertiary level only 'keep' one third of its conventional returns is certainly a large adjustment. The result that this adjustment is sufficient to more than reverse the positions of primary and tertiary education with respect to their marginal returns suggests that the 'true' marginal returns to lower 6 and higher levels of schooling may be aprroximately equal if we go some way, but not quite as far, in the direction of recognising the dependence of the latter on the former.
As noted, the Shapley-adjusted returns are pseudo-marginal in that they do not directly relate to the individual decision problem of educational progression. While individuals need not care about which education level their earnings are 'attributed' to, this question is, however, of great interest for setting public policy. From this perspective, the difference in interpretation between 'proper' marginal and pseudo-marginal returns is not clear-cut, however. Neither refer to the use of 'marginal dollars of public funds', after all. Even conventional marginal returns are therefore correctly interpreted as merely motivating general development priorities.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that if dependencies between school levels are taken into account, prevailing conventional 'face value' returns to different levels of education do not differ sufficiently to serve as a sound justification for strongly privileging one level over another in prioritising educational development.
